Founded out of independent security research. Built around a generalized framework for cached-executable security across policy transitions.
StaamlCorp was founded by Stanley Lee Linton, a cybersecurity researcher and software engineer based in Louisiana. The company’s intellectual property originated from a finding made during independent security research conducted between January and April 2025.
While analyzing how Safari managed cached content across security mode transitions, Stanley identified a previously undocumented class of vulnerability — designated LDB-01 (Lockdown-Bypass-01). Cached WebAssembly modules, JavaScript blobs, and Service Worker scripts that had been stored during normal operation remained executable after a device transitioned into Lockdown Mode — Apple’s most hardened security state, designed to protect high-risk individuals from targeted cyber-attacks.
Cached content from before Lockdown Mode activation could continue executing under what users believed was their most restrictive security state. The behavior persisted across app restarts and device reboots.
Independent security research uncovers the LDB-01 vulnerability class: cached executable content persists and executes in Safari after Lockdown Mode activation on iOS, iPadOS, and macOS.
Comprehensive vulnerability report submitted to Apple through their Security Research Program, including proof-of-concept code, reproduction steps, and impact analysis.
Apple confirms reproduction of the issue: "We reproduced the issue and are investigating." Remediation planned for Fall 2025. Multi-round technical exchange with Apple Product Security.
Apple assigns internal CVE reference webkit-294380 to the vulnerability.
Apple ships the fix in iOS 26 and iPadOS 26. Stanley credited in Apple security advisories. Apple issues a monetary recognition award for the disclosure.
Utility patent application filed for the generalized, platform-independent framework — 30 claims covering detection, validation, and mitigation across cache layers and policy transitions.
Apple’s remediation addressed the specific instance on their own platform. The underlying class — cached executable content surviving a security policy change — appears wherever those two conditions coexist: a system that caches executables, and a security model that supports policy transitions.
StaamlCorp’s pending application covers the generalized architectural framework. The claims are written to operate across operating systems, across cache types, and across policy transition types — from OS lockdown modes and enterprise MDM to browser security levels and AI sandbox policies.
The framework is intended for broad deployment under the Licensing Policy.
We treat cached executable persistence across security policy transitions as a systematically under-addressed surface in modern computing. The pending claims, the technical briefs in Resources, and ongoing research are oriented toward this surface.
Patent licensing is the deployment path we have chosen. We engage with platform vendors, browser teams, enterprise security providers, and AI platforms whose products fall within the framework’s scope, on fair and reasonable terms.
Adjacent research continues into AI sandbox policy transitions, agent-cache architectures, and cache-layer assumptions in emerging compute platforms.